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Introduction
Three major waves of change have occurred in the global economy in recent decades. First, there was the reduction of barriers to flows of goods, finance and information. The second involved a shift of economic power from West to East. Third, but only just beginning, is a restructuring towards a greener global economy due to the threat of climate chaos.
China was the main beneficiary of the first wave. Through a process of integration into global value chains, China was able to build up its production capabilities very quickly. This laid the basis for the second wave, the emergence of China as a driver of global change, altering the parameters for competing in the global economy. China has transformed the global map of manufacturing industry. Over a short period it has acquired production capabilities challenging the old industrial powers and forcing them to switch to other stages of the value chain or to other sectors. The green sectors were originally thought be immune from this. During the 2000s
Europe expected that its renewable energy industries would retain global pre-eminence and become a bastion of green growth and jobs. Now we know that China is also transforming these green industries.
This chapter examines this challenge from China for Europe's green industry -showing both intense competition and close cooperation. It shows how and why these relationships vary between green sectors and different stages of the value chain. This is the core of the chapter. We then show how the global financial crisis influenced the Chinese challenge for Europe and reflect on how the new division of labour affects the chances of mitigating climate chaos. The chapter thus traces some of the inter-connections between two of the challenges discussed in this book: the economic challenge and climate change.
Concentrating on how China challenges Europe in the global green economy might seem a surprising choice given that China has gained a reputation for damaging its own and the world's environment. Indeed, over more than three decades of resource-intensive growth and reliance on coal-fired power plants, Chinese CO2-intensity is among the highest in the world (Ecofys, 2014 ; see also chapter 1 in this volume). However, having become the world's greatest source of carbon dioxide emissions in the first decade of this millennium, China has now become the world's largest investor in renewable energy and other green sectors (BNEF, 2013) .
China is thus becoming a major player in the global green economy with domestic firms rapidly catching up with the world leaders.
The ramifications for European industry vary a great deal, in particular in renewable energy.
In hydropower, China has now become the world's leading exporter of dams for electricity generations. Starting with building up its capabilities by supplying the home market, lead firms such as Sino Hydro have become multinational enterprises. While they operate globally, they mainly compete with European firms in the developing world (Huang and Fang, 2013) . In the solar photovoltaic industry, the local Chinese market only became important more recently.
This industry started out as an export-oriented industry and by 'learning from exporting', Chinese producers have moved from supplying components to complete solar panels in a short time-span. By the late 2000s they undercut European (and American) producers, leading to major job losses and prompting a trade war (Fischer, 2012; Luetkenhorst and Pegels, 2014) .
This painful solar experience has affected not just the European competitors in this sector but the discussion on green growth more generally. As noted by Geels (2013, p. 83) .
The green growth discourse in Western countries is hindered by cheap Chinese competition, which caused over-capacity, tumbling prices, and bankruptcy or job reductions for many Western wind and solar companies. The industrial shake-out and job losses led politicians to criticize the use of Western government subsidies (for renewable energy) to stimulate Chinese industries.
This chapter sheds light on the assumptions made in the discourse referred to by Geels. It does so by examining the interconnection between China and Europe in the wind power industry. It shows that the changing relationships have to be seen in the context of the global financial crisis. We cannot isolate a 'China effect' because the increasing competitive pressure from China coincides with the global financial crisis.
The European wind power turbine industry was working at full throttle when the financial crisis broke out in 2008. Most manufacturers and component suppliers were working at maximum capacity. Due to long lead times, the effects of the crisis were initially not felt fully, being mitigated to some extent by financial stimulus packages. But 2008 was nevertheless a turning point where overcapacity caused prices to fall. Starting that year, prices fell by more than 20 per cent over the next three years (Gosens and Lu, 2014, p. 310) . Today, in 2014, the European industry is just beginning to rebound from falling prices, major job losses and dwindling profits. 1 It is clear that the global financial crisis and the scaling back of national government support has had an adverse effect on the European wind power industry (Luetkenhorst and Pegels, 2014; Sørensen and Springborg, 2010) . It is less clear how the rise of China as a major wind power nation has affected the European wind power industry and what the prospects are for 1 Tens of thousands of European jobs were lost in the wind power industry during the economic downturn. Denmark has the highest proportion of wind power jobs in Europe. During 2009 when the crisis gathered speed, the Danish wind power industry lost 4,000 industrial jobs out of a total of approximately 28,000 in just one year. Subcontractors accounted for more than 3,000 of those jobs (Sørensen and Springborg, 2010) . competition versus cooperation between European and Chinese firms. This is the question on which we focus in this chapter.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides essential background information on China's wind power market and its drivers. Section 3 analyses the growing competition among the international wind turbine producers in recent years, highlighting the rapid advance of Chinese firms in the global top ten and the parameters on which they compete with European firms. While the competition between European and Chinese lead firms is strong, there are also many examples of cooperation. In order to explain this, section 4 sets out the value chain of wind turbine production and innovation. This provides the analytical basis for unravelling surprising forms of cooperation between Chinese and European firms. This cooperation is driven by the pressure on Chinese firms to catch up and improve the quality of their products and the pressure on European firms to gain access to the large and rapidly expanding Chinese market. Reflecting on these findings, section 5 asks wider questions about China's role in Europe's crises, stressing the need to differentiate carefully between and within sectors.
Section 6 discusses economic and political ways forward and Section 7 sets out questions for further research.
China and the green economy
The purpose of this section is to provide some background on the build-up of China's green economy. China now boasts the world's largest renewable energy system, generating over 1 trillion kWh (in 2013) from water, wind and sun (Mathews and Tan, 2014) . After decades of rapid and 'dirty' economic progress, China has begun to set targets devised to reduce the carbon intensity of growth, in particular by investing in renewables.
The forces of change
The rationale for investing in low-carbon restructuring differed from European countries, at least initially. While the first push in Europe three to four decades ago was spurred by a growing environmental movement, China's initial turn to green technologies was mainly rooted in industrial development and energy security interests rather than in environmental considerations (Schmitz, 2015) . The main concerns were reducing dependence on imported energy, building competitive industries, and (at the local level) creating jobs and raising public revenue (Dai, 2014) .
Recent years, however, have seen a growing dissatisfaction with the environmental degradation and smog in the rapidly growing Chinese urban areas. Chinese policy makers are struggling with how to combine high economic growth -still demanded by those left behind in the Chinese take-off -with reducing pollution and carbon dioxide emissions, let alone an absolute decline in the use of fossil fuels (cf. Clark and Hornby, 2014) . One part of the solutionthe consequences of which are now being felt in many parts of the world -is the fostering of the renewable energy industries.
The financial crisis proved to be an important turning point because financial stimuli packages were dedicated to boosting green industries. In 2008 as well as in 2009 the financial stimuli packages in China were more ambitious than any other nation when it comes to investments earmarked for green industries (Morrison and Yoshida, 2009) . China allocated 5.3 per cent of GDP to these sectors of the economy through green stimulus packages. Countries in the EU also identified investment in renewable energy as a way to overcome the crisis, create jobs and develop new growth perspectives, but to a much smaller degree. For example, Germany, a forerunner in greening the economy, allocated roughly 0.5 per cent of GDP through the stimulus package in 2008 (Barbier, 2010) . In China the green stimulus strategy proved to be an inflection point in the growth path which became visible over the coming years.
The significance of China in renewable Mathews and Tan (2014) suggest that the year 2013 marked a significant change in the country's energy trajectory because the scales tipped towards electricity generated from renewables compared to coal and nuclear. In 2013, renewables accounted for 60 per cent of new electricity generation capacity of which 11 GW was solar and 16 GW wind turbines (Clark and Hornby, 2014; GWEC, 2014) . This high share of added capacity from renewables in electricity generation is higher in China than in most other countries in the world. Although this is still far from the expansion required to meet targets set by climate scientists, Mathews and Tan (2014) assert that carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector in China can be expected to fall However, only a very small share of these exports went to Europe, whereas the majority of turbines were exported to emerging markets (Lema et al., 2013, pp. 52-54) .
This rapid expansion of wind power capacity in China is mainly a result of favourable government policies. These policies have contributed to rapidly growing internal markets for renewable energy. As in Europe, large subsidies are involved, since the cost of generating electricity from wind and sun is still higher in most Chinese locations than that of fossil-fuel based energy. 2 The current high share of coal in the energy mix, combined with rapid economic growth in heavy industries, has put China in the position of being the biggest CO 2 emitter globally (IEA 2014). However, a large share of China's emissions is due to exports -approximately 23 per cent of Chinese emissions are due to China's insertion into global value chains catering for the European and North American markets (Watson and Wang, 2007) . energy market and the policies that support it. The global demand for wind energy is shifting to the East. European countries and the US have long been the dominant markets in the global wind power sector but by 2010 more than half of newly installed wind power capacity was added outside these traditional markets. China has been the main driver of this development.
Within just half a decade or so, China has managed to build the largest market for wind power in the world. This is the home market from which Chinese firms are now taking off and competing internationally.
Competition
The world keeps observing China's economic rise with a mixture of admiration and trepidation: admiration because the speed and depth of the country's economic transformation are unprecedented in history; trepidation because China has increased the competitive pressure on industry in many countries and sectors. There is now a substantial literature on the impact of China's industrial transformation in creating both considerable threats but also new opportunities for industry in other countries (Eichengreen, 2006; Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008; Jenkins and Barbosa, 2012; Fujita, 2013) . This chapter seeks to show how this balance of threats and opportunities has been unfolding in the European wind turbine industry. Section 3 discusses the increasing competition between Europe and China while Section 4 examines the opportunities for cooperation.
The rise of Chinese lead firms
The rotating blades of wind turbines have become an iconic symbol of the green economy.
Until recently, Europe was the global leader in producing and using such wind turbines. This European leadership rested largely on the green investments of two countries, Denmark and Germany. Most of our discussion of Europe refers to these two countries. Denmark was the pioneer in producing and using wind power, but Germany caught up rapidly. Today, both countries remain global leaders in innovation but China has become number one in the production of wind turbines. China is also catching up in developing new wind power technology (Lewis, 2013) . Unpacking and understanding this overall picture is essential for the central argument of this chapter concerning the co-existence of competition and cooperation.
Competition is intense and most visible when we concentrate on the lead firms of the wind power industry. Table 1 gives some idea of the competitive pressure on Europe and the speed of China's advance. It shows the top ten turbine manufacturers in the world. While in 2005, seven of the top ten firms were European and none were Chinese, by 2010 there were four Chinese firms in the top ten. By 2013 this number had reduced to three but four of the following five wind turbine manufacturers just below the top were also Chinese (NAW 2014).
Europe remained strong with five in the top ten by 2013 but clearly less strong than in 2005 (Table 1 ). The big loser has been General Electric, whose market share declined from 17.7 per cent in 2005 to less than five per cent in 2013. The lead firms compete head-on, in particular for the major contracts -equipping the new wind farms. The market is differentiated according to different types and sizes of turbines (customized for different wind speeds, temperatures and onshore/offshore installation). Overall, however, Europe has the edge with regard to product differentiation, large scale and off-shore turbines, and reliability, and China with respect to price and medium and small scale on-shore turbines.
The sources of economic power
In order to understand the competitive dynamics, it helps to observe how China was able to increase its share of the global market. Here one can distinguish four sources of competitiveness which need to be distinguished individually but which also significantly reinforce each other. 3
The first is the strength of the home market. The Chinese government -understandably concerned with energy security -has fostered the production of renewable energy. The Renewable Energy
Law of 2005 was the central piece of legislation. Along with other complementary policies, it 3 In this chapter we do not deal with a fifth source coordination power, one which derives from highly modular supply chains in China (Lema et al., 2013) .
helped to create a rapidly expanding internal market for wind power. Foreign enterprises were not prevented from competing in this market but Chinese enterprises were favoured, receiving Denmark and particularly Enercon of Germany -produced many of these parts in-house (seeking to constantly improve design and quality), their Chinese counterparts relied much more on buying components from suppliers who also supplied other turbine makers and were thus able to achieve economies of scale and reduce costs.
The third source of competitiveness is financing power. This is as yet little explored in the literature but is of increasing importance. The essential point is that Chinese firms can offer supplier credit but this is much more difficult for Western firms. This matters greatly for their customers since investment requirements for wind farms are high and time-frames are long. The head-on competition between Europe and China which we have stressed so far -and which dominates the discourse in the media and business press -occurs between the lead firms in turbine manufacturing. A different picture emerges, however, if we shift our focus to different stages of the value chain, namely turbine design, component design and deployment (Figure 1 ). The next section examines these different parts of the value chain.
Cooperation
Value chain analysis offers a valuable analytical tool for understanding how the global map of industrial production has changed (Gereffi, 1999) . It has proved particularly valuable for understanding the speed with which newcomers come to compete in the global economy (Schmitz, 2006) and how different ways of organizing the global value chain affect the ability to compete (Sturgeon, 2002) .The innovation part of the value chain, however, has remained relatively underexplored.
This is beginning to be addressed in new work on the organizational decomposition of the innovation process -ODIP (Schmitz and Strambach, 2009 ). The essence of value chain analysis, namely slicing the value-adding process into separate activities, was extended to the innovation process. The starting point for this line of investigation was the fundamental change in the way innovation is organized. Innovation activities that used to be carried out in-house are now often transferred to independent suppliers of knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) or suppliers of key components. This helps with understanding the changing global innovation map. Using such ODIP analysis, we have shown shifts in innovation power to Brazil and India, as evidenced in the auto and software industries . Analysing the organizational decomposition of the innovation process is essential for understanding the issue that is central to this paper -the relationships between European and Chinese firms in the wind power industry.
Cooperation in licensing and co-design relationships
European wind turbine makers rely more on their internal capabilities than their Chinese counterparts, but even they cannot do everything in-house. As noted earlier, a wind turbine is a very complex product, with some parts requiring highly specialized expertise. 
. Links between European KIBS and Chinese manufacturers
The underlying shift in technology relationships is captured by Lewis (2013) While the globalization of the innovation process has contributed to this process, it was also supported by favourable domestic factors, notably public policies (Section 2 of this chapter; Cunningham, 2014) , investments in the local innovation systems (Gosens and Lu, 2013 ), investments in firm-level learning (Qiu and Anadon, 2012) and other factors typically emphasized in the catch-up literature (Lee, 2005; Bell and Figueiredo, 2012) . 4 The shift from licensing to co-design has also received increasing attention from Chinese scholars, notably Qiu and Anadon (2012), Ru et al. (2012) , Wang et al. (2012) , Zhou et al. (2012) and Dai et al. (2014) .
Cooperation across value chain functions
In addition to the collaborative relationships between European turbine designers and 
China's rise -Europe's crisis?
The picture which dominates the media is that China's rise has contributed to Europe's crisis.
Careful research shows that the China effect varies between countries and sectors (Venables and Yueh, 2006; Jacques, 2012) . Nevertheless, competitive pressures have increased for most industrial enterprises, including those operating in the green economy.
The reconfiguration of competition and cooperation, as described above, has important ramifications both from a European economic crisis perspective and from a sustainability perspective. As shown in this chapter, the assertion that cheap Chinese competition is the root cause of over-capacity, unemployment and falling share prices in the wind power industry in
Europe is an exaggeration. In wind power, the competition from China on European soil is still very limited (Lema et al., 2013, pp. 52-53) . The mitigating effects include high-transportation costs, the inability (of Chinese lead firms) to meet European quality standards and certain tendencies to favour national firms in major public projects (Lema et al., 2011). 5 Overcapacity in Europe arose first and foremost from austerity policies which scaled back government support for wind power and led to the cancellation of major projects. The investment surge of recent years was just starting to ease the supply-chain bottlenecks when the credit crunch arrived and cut demand. The result has been a dramatic and permanent change to the dynamics of the industry. On the supply side prices are falling towards marginal costs, and several players will consolidate. On the demand side renewable energy targets will still drive utilities to build projects, but fewer developers and independent power producers will be involved (Fritz-Morgenthal, 2009, p. 1).
The picture which thus emerges is that, while China is driving the changes in the wind power industry, it would be misleading to see it as the main cause of the crisis in this industry.
China's rise coincided with the global financial-economic crisis, but Chinese competition was not a major cause of job losses and dwindling share prices in Europe. Subsidies for wind energy in Europe accrue almost exclusively to European firms as Chinese firms are yet to make a major foray into the European market. However, the European firms are aware that this might change, since they compete with Chinese firms in third markets and know their cost advantages. They are also forewarned by the rapidly changing fortunes of the European (and American) solar power industries.
Indeed, it is worth reflecting on our findings in a comparative way. The balance between competition and cooperation in Europe-China relationships differs between green industries, notably between wind and solar photovoltaic industries. A brief comparison helps to see the need for such a differentiated analysis.
As shown in this chapter, China's entry into the wind energy industry is reshaping the relationships between Europe and China in major ways. A big domestic market was critical for building China's production capacity; this in turn put pressure on European incumbents and drove down costs.
China has also caused major disruption and drove down costs in the solar panel industry, but the dynamics were different. Here Chinese firms managed to build up producer power by catering for the European market; initially the domestic market -and reducing green house gas emissions domestically -played less of a role. Figure 4 shows how solar PV production was driven by exports during industry 'take off'. Exports enabled China to emerge as the new leader (replacing the EU) in producing solar PV equipment (Fischer, 2012) . However, in contrast to the wind sector, in which Chinese manufacturers still produce predominantly for the Chinese market, the Chinese PV sector has emerged partly on the basis of policy support for solar-energy deployment schemes outside China, mainly in Europe. The development of China's PV sector originated from the production of PV cells and modules. By focusing on these elements, enterprises concentrated on the steps in the PV value chain where they had competitive advantages due to low labour costs, economies of scale and comparatively weak environmental standards applied to production processes. The development of the Chinese PV sector and exports to Europe has been facilitated by modularisation and comparatively low transportation costs.
In China, government support for these activities was driven by local economic considerations and was similar to support given by local government to other export-oriented industries (Iizuka, 2014) . Support schemes for the use and deployment of PV energy technology in China evolved in the context of the global financial crisis when export-oriented producers of PV cells and modules faced falling external orders, particularly in Germany. Hence, when the central government started to support PV energy use within China in 2009, the Chinese PV industry was already a highly capable producer and a fierce competitor in global markets. Figure 4 shows how domestic sales were increased dramatically when exports began to stagnate in 2011 and then fell from 2012 -thus compensating for decreasing external demand and ensuring overall growth in output.
This was almost the complete opposite to the route taken in the wind turbine industry where the local Chinese market was the mainstay for domestic firms and where exporting came later.
The patterns of competition and collaboration therefore differed in important ways both during and after the financial crisis.
In summary, the two green sectors are now highly globalized and Europe's leadership is challenged in both. However, keeping in mind our focus on competition and cooperation with China, the value chains lens shows that the challenges take different forms in the two sectors.
Hence there is also a need for differentiated responses when it comes to finding ways forward.
Ways forward
There is no shortage of contentious accounts of EU-China relationships in renewable energy.
China is portrayed as causing the problems for the green industry and the climate. This chapter highlights the need to go beyond media headlines and simplistic rhetoric. Cutting through the complexities is essential for understanding the rapidly changing world.
Currently, we observe that competition between the lead firms of the wind and solar PV industries is increasing rapidly, not least as a result of China's increasing production and innovation power. From a green transformation perspective, this development is to be welcomed as it drives down the price of renewable-energy technology, supporting the reduction of greenhouse gases. Policy-makers in China and Europe, of course, are concerned about not only the global gains, but also the distribution of those gains among nations.
In a rapidly globalizing renewable-energy sector, however, it is becoming increasingly difficult to define the 'national content' of a wind turbine or a solar PV panel. Production and innovation in both sectors are increasingly globalized. This can be turned to mutual advantage.
For example, the Chinese system of renewable-energy production is entering a new stage where it is increasingly important to improve the quality and reliability of technology. Hence, Chinese lead firms should seek to collaborate with European companies at various stages of the value chain to develop this expertise. In turn, Europe, in its current stage of getting back on its feet after a prolonged financial and economic crisis, is in need of more affordable renewable-energy technology. European lead firms, under pressure to reduce costs, may be able to cooperate with Chinese firms and access capabilities and resources for scaling up. The China effect has certainly been painful for German and other affected producers in the solar PV industry. The question is whether a similar process may occur in wind power. From a European perspective, the gloomy observer might suggest that while the many relationships between European design houses and Chinese wind power producers may create or preserve jobs and profits in Europe, the industry needs to be viewed from a dynamic perspective. These design houses and their engagement in co-design relations may be undermining the competitiveness of European producers in the long run, with the consequence that the wind industry in Europe will follow a similar pattern to the solar photovoltaic industry. We do not think this likely. Due to the markedly different technological characteristics of solar PV and wind energy and the associated differences in industrial organisation, there will be a less dramatic China effect in the manufacturing part of the wind power value chain. It is more likely that regional production networks will be strengthened. As with the automotive industry, 'regional' European, Asian and American networks are likely to co-exist in which different lead firms dominate and compete globally while producing and sourcing mainly locally.
Value chain analysis can be a powerful tool for designing intelligent policies for the support of European renewable energy sectors that are faced with global competition in different ways.
The multiple challenges confronting Europe today (climate change, reduced public finances and competitive pressures from Asia) call for highly selective and directed strategies to support markets and new collaborative business models.
Developing and implementing such selective green industrial policy is not easy. The technological, economic and political uncertainties are considerable (Schmitz et al., 2013) . In order to succeed, green industrial policy needs to focus on specific sub-sectors and adopt specific instruments aimed at developing and deploying specific technologies. Predicting which technology to support for how long means making choices about allocating policy rents on the basis of highly incomplete information. The uncertainties are exacerbated by the long time-horizons needed for new energy systems to become viable. Yet, mitigating climate change requires action now. Climate and earth scientists warn that delaying action means incurring rising costs and potentially irreversible damage.
This combination of uncertainties makes green industrial policy particularly challenging.
Elsewhere we have argued that the way forward lies in lies in putting politics centre stage and taking four critical steps. The first is to recognize that no single actor has the resources necessary to bring about the green transformation. The second is to recognize that within government, civil society and business there are actors seeking to block or slow down the green transformation. Third, attention needs to focus on supportive alliances across these categories.
Fourth, including actors with different motives helps one to understand and accelerate the green transformation process (Schmitz, 2015) .
The last point is particularly critical for the concerns of this book. There are a range of actors that can support climate-relevant policies (e.g. by investing, providing expertise or lobbying) but their motive need not be mitigating climate change; the main motive might be to secure energy, to build competitive green industries, or to foster green jobs -with climate change mitigation at best a 'co-benefit ' (Dubash et al., 2013) . Acting upon this can be a 'game changer' and provide the basis for building transformative alliances. The problem for European countries is that China's rise makes it more difficult to build such alliances.
Mobilizing political support for green policies in Germany, Denmark or other European countries is much harder if many of the resulting jobs are created in China. So the question at the core of this chapter -competition or cooperation between Europe and China -has ramifications for the political dynamics behind green industrial policies.
Questions for future research
The insights provided in this chapter contribute to understanding a number of questions which are not the core focus here but are nevertheless critical for Europe and the rest of the world. We set out five questions that can provide a starting point for future research. Second, there is world-wide concern that China's economic rise has triggered a global 'race to the bottom'. While the mobilization of China's industrial reserve army has exerted a downward pressure on wages and prices in many industries, its firms are not stopping at competing by price cutting but are also now competing by innovating (Altenburg et al., 2008) . The wind power industry analysed in this chapter shows that the country is undergoing this transformation in record time. New research is needed that gives specific attention to the time scale over which China is catching up in this technological area. The need to pay greater attention to the time-scales of building up innovation capability has been set out in detail by Bell (2006) . This chapter suggests that such research focus on the combination of internal and external capabilities. Collaboration with external KIBS has provided a relatively fast route to catching up, but exactly how fast has it been and how deep do the Chinese innovation capabilities go?
Third, there is world-wide concern that China's rapid growth is polluting the planet and harming the climate. While China has indeed contributed more than any other nation to the recent increases in carbon dioxide emissions, it has also become the number one investor in renewable energy (BNEF, 2013) . This paper suggests that these investments are being used productively to establish competitive green industries. Mathews (2012) even suggests that China may be on its way to developing a 'green model of industrial capitalism'. Examining the reality of this proposition requires research which compares the growth rates of investment in low versus high carbon industries and which compares the strength of alliances supporting low versus high carbon industries. Such studies need to take into account the above mentioned insight that 'green alliances' are not necessarily driven by environmental concerns but also by concerns with energy security and competitiveness in green industries. Chinese business models for poorer parts of the world.
